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This paper explores some ways in which artificial intelligence (AI) could be 
used to improve human moral judgments in bioethics by avoiding some of the most 
common sources of error in moral judgment, including ignorance, confusion, and 
bias. It surveys three existing proposals for building human morality into AI: Top-
down, bottom-up, and hybrid approaches. Then it proposes a multi-step, hybrid 
method, using the example of kidney allocations for transplants as a test case. The 
paper concludes with brief remarks about how to handle several complications, 
respond to some objections, and extend this novel method to other important moral 
issues in bioethics and beyond.
Morality and computing are often seen as opposite ends of a spectrum: 
Computing is hard science, formal, and unfeeling, whereas morality is soft, situation-
al, and emotional. They could not be further apart, according to this common view. 
This contrast raises questions of whether we could ever bring morality and computers 
together—and if so, how. These questions become all the more pressing as Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are increasingly used to make or guide 
medical decisions that raise moral issues. But what is the point of bringing comput-
ing and morality together in the medical context? One goal is to use AI to improve 
human moral judgments in bioethics. In this article, we propose a way to do this. But 
first we need to see why humans need help.
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SOME PROBLEMS
A kidney transplant surgeon told us that he was woken up at 3 a.m. and told that 
a car crash had killed a kidney donor, so he had to decide which of his patients would 
receive this kidney. He had only a few minutes to make this life-changing decision, 
because the kidney would not remain viable for long, and the chances of a successful 
transplant were going down every minute. The staff needed to prepare the chosen 
patient for surgery, and the doctor needed to leave as soon as possible for the hospital 
to do the surgery. He was still groggy from sleep, he had no time to review patient 
charts, and he presumably liked some of his patients more than others. This kind of 
situation is far from ideal for forming moral judgments about who should receive a 
kidney.
Other moral judgments are formed in better settings. When there is time for 
a hospital ethics committee to exchange views, and its members have had time to 
review information about the relevant patients, one might expect moral judgments 
to be more trustworthy. That is why hospitals have ethics committees. However, 
members of hospital ethics committees rarely have time to review all of the relevant 
information carefully, and they often meet too briefly for everyone on the committee 
to be able to present their perspectives fully. Moreover, some members of the group 
might be more willing to listen to certain members rather than others with equally 
valid perspectives. And groupthink is also a danger. Of course, hospital ethics com-
mittees try to avoid these distortions, but they often fail, like other committees.
In addition, a committee of experts often has different values than the local 
community. Sometimes experts’ judgments are superior to those of the public, but 
the public is not always as misguided as many elites assume. Experts sometimes learn 
from the public. In any case, what the public thinks still matters, both because public 
moral concerns might be different but still valid, and also because the public pays 
for public hospitals, which gives them some right to have their values represented. 
Moreover, ignoring the public’s values lead to miscommunication and misunder-
standing and might make the public less inclined to support the hospital. Involving 
healthcare service users in planning and research can help clinicians and administra-
tors identify potential problems before they arise. In these ways, aligning healthcare 
services with the values of stakeholders is not only fair but also useful.
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SOURCES OF ERROR
Of course, the public is not always right. Sometimes they are misinformed, for-
getful, confused, emotional, or biased. In such cases, we can still ask what the public 
would say about a moral issue if they were not misled in these ways. This method 
of extrapolation was suggested by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his opinions about 
capital punishment:
In Furman [v. Georgia, 1972], I observed that the American people are 
largely unaware of the information critical to a judgment on the morality 
of the death penalty, and concluded that if they were better informed they 
would consider it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. 408 U.S. at 360-69. 
(Marshall, 1976)
This “Marshall Hypothesis” has been confirmed (Sarat & Vidmar, 1976) and 
suggests more generally that we can use statistical methods to find out not only what 
the public does believe now but also what they would believe under more ideal circum-
stances. Public policies can then be based on these idealized views, although doing so 
will be controversial.
Marshall emphasized factual ignorance, but other factors also distort moral judg-
ments. We all sometimes forget or fail to attend adequately to morally relevant facts. 
When many complex considerations support each side of an issue, we all sometimes 
get overwhelmed and confused. In addition, intense anger, disgust, and fear often 
lead us to fixate on a small subset of the morally relevant facts or even to base our 
moral judgments on factors that are morally irrelevant, such as physical appearance 
or height. Yet another source of moral error is bias in a broad sense that includes 
cognitive biases and favoritism towards oneself and one’s family and friends as well 
as racial or gender prejudice.
Most people (including many moral anti-realists) admit that moral judgments 
should not be based on ignorance, forgetfulness, inattention, confusion, excessive 
emotion, or bias. They cite such influences to criticize other people’s moral judg-
ments, even while they fail to apply the same standards to themselves. Thus, these 
factors are distortions even according to people who are subject to them. To call them 
errors is not to impose external standards that they reject.
Disputes still arise over whether a particular moral judgment is based on such 
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sources of error. Opponents often accuse each other of ignorance, forgetfulness, in-
attention, confusion, powerful emotion, and bias. How can we settle such disputes? 
In our view, the best way is to predict which moral judgments each side would make if 
they were not ignorant, forgetful, inattentive, confused, overly emotional, or biased. 
Accurate predictions can point to corrected moral judgments that reflect people’s 
deeply-held values rather than their fleeting foibles. The point is not to impose ex-
ternal standards that they might reject but instead to help them apply their own 
standards.1 
But how can we predict what humans would endorse in such idealized circum-
stances? The answer might lie in AI. When properly programmed, AI has the po-
tential to find, store, and use a lot more information than humans, even if not all 
information. AI also will not forget or fail to attend to any information, will not get 
confused by complex information, will not be misled by intense emotions, and could 
potentially reduce bias (see below).2 Thus, many of the most common sources of moral 
errors by humans might be avoided by computers that are properly programmed.
How can we program human morality into computers? Following Wallach 
& Allen (2009), we can distinguish three main ways: top-down, bottom-up, and a 
hybrid. We will discuss these three in turn.
TOP-DOWN
The top-down approach starts with principles at a high level of generality, then 
programs them into a computer along with information about particular situations, 
and finally applies the principle to the situation to infer a moral judgment. One crucial 
question for this approach is: Which principles?
A popular contender is Isaac Asimov’s three laws of robotics (Asimov 1950):
1.  This distinction between corrected and raw moral judgments is analogous to the distinction 
between competence and performance in a language (Mikhail, 2007). Just as a language can be 
characterized by competence rather than performance, so human morality can be characterized by 
the moral judgments we would make if we were not misled by ignorance, forgetfulness, inattention, 
confusion, excessive emotion, or bias.
2.  This is not meant to downplay the fact that AI applications can and do produce new forms (or 
reproduce and exacerbate existing forms) of bias against marginalized groups. A growing body of 
popular and scholarly work addresses these questions in detail, and so our strategy here is to ac-
knowledge this work, while also exploring the possibilities of AI to counteract these biases in some 
medical contexts.
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A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm.
A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such 
orders would conflict with the First Law.
A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the First or Second Laws.
These simple rules strike many people as plausible, but they quickly run into 
trouble. Should a robot roam the world preventing any harm to any human? What is 
a robot to do when one human attacks another human, and the robot cannot prevent 
harm to the victim without injuring the aggressor? And what is a robot to do when 
one human tells the robot to go to the United States now, but another human tells 
the robot to go to the United Kingdom now? Such examples show that Asimov’s laws 
are inadequate.
Perhaps philosophers can do better. Consequentialist moral theorists propose 
that we should do whatever maximizes good consequences and minimizes bad con-
sequences for everyone in the long run (Driver, 2012). This principle sounds plau-
sible, but it has been criticized vigorously, and consequentialism might be especially 
dangerous in the context of AI. The best way to minimize suffering and death in the 
long run might be to kill all humans now (because after that no humans would die or 
suffer or hurt other animals). Thus, if we program AI to minimize bad consequenc-
es, it might try to kill us all (Bostrom, 2014). Moreover, a computer cannot apply a 
consequentialist principle to a concrete case without having information about how 
all options would affect all people in the long run. It is not clear how to obtain this 
information or whether applying it could be computationally tractable. And if con-
sequentialists try to ameliorate this problem by focusing on only some people in the 
short run, then it is not clear how they could justify choosing those people or that 
time frame. Some theorists have attempted to overcome these problems (Gips, 1995) 
but without much success (Wallach & Allen, 2009, 86-90).
The problem of inadequate information could be solved if simple rules were 
programmed into the computer. A computer could determine whether an act vio-
lates the rule “Keep our promises” without having to calculate any consequences of 
that act. To determine whether an act violates the rule “Don’t kill”, a computer would 
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have to determine whether the act causes death, but it still would not have to calcu-
late all of the consequences of the act for other people far in the future. So it would 
be easier (though still not easy) to program such rules into computers.
Rules like these seem to have exceptions, however. Despite disputes over inter-
pretation, Immanuel Kant seems to argue that it is morally wrong to lie even when 
lying is the only way to save a friend from an assassin (Kant, 1797). Absolute rules like 
this might be simple enough to program into an AI, but most people would reject the 
resulting judgments.
Other rule-based moral theorists are not absolutists. W. D. Ross, for example, 
provided a list of seven basic duties: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, benefi-
cence, non-maleficence, and self-improvement (Ross, 1930). In medical ethics, Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress proposed principles of Respect for Autonomy, 
Beneficence, Non-maleficence, and Justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2019). They all 
admit that these duties or principles can be overridden, so they allow lying or violat-
ing another duty or principle to save a life in some cases. This flexibility makes this ap-
proach plausible, but it also makes it hard to program into a computer. Concepts like 
justice, fidelity, and autonomy are too vague to program into a computer. Moreover, 
these duties and principles are bound to conflict sometimes, and then how is a com-
puter supposed to tell which reasons are adequate to override a duty or principle? 
Without some way of resolving conflicts between overridable duties, the computer 
will not be able to reach any conclusion about what an agent ought to do overall. Yet 
another problem is how to determine which rules and weights to deploy. Again, some 
theorists have attempted to solve these problems (Anderson & Anderson, 2011) but 
without much success (Arkin, 2009, 106-108; Wallach & Allen, 2009, 127-129).
The biggest problem for the top-down approach is that it requires us to choose 
which principles to use at the top. As we saw, competing moral theorists want differ-
ent principles, and it is hard to see how to justify picking one set of principles instead 
of another. That is why others try to another approach that does not assume any 
principles, rules, or duties.
BOTTOM-UP
A second approach works in the opposite direction. Instead of applying general 
principles to particular cases, the bottom-up approach derives principles from cases. 
The most promising examples of this approach use unsupervised deep learning. 
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The method is deep insofar as it uses multiple levels of nodes connected by edges. 
Reinforcement learning occurs when the weights of these edges—that is, the prob-
ability that activation of one node leads to activation of a connected node—increase 
or decrease in light of success or failure at a task. This process is unsupervised insofar as 
the programmer does not impose or assume any theory or even categories in advance. 
The AI itself determines which categories work best for the task.
A plausible application of unsupervised deep learning to moral judgment would 
require several steps. First, researchers ask many (perhaps 1000) participants to de-
scribe many (perhaps 100) moral problems. Each problem must be described in the 
participant’s own words, and each participant needs to indicate which option in the 
scenario is morally wrong. Next, each participant needs to read many (perhaps 100) 
of the moral scenarios that other participants wrote and indicate which actions are 
morally wrong in those other scenarios. The researcher thus accumulates moral judg-
ments by the thousands.
With enough data of adequate quality, the AI could perhaps construct a model 
that will predict the human participant’s moral judgments on the basis of the words 
in the scenarios. Using a simplistic form of cross-validation, it could, for example, use 
90% of the scenarios as a training set to develop its model, use the remaining 10% of 
the scenarios to test how well that model can predict moral judgments in new cases, 
revise the model to the extent that its predictions are inaccurate in that testing set, and 
test it again on a completely new set separate from the old training set. Each time it is 
tested and revised, the computer learns. That is why this method is machine learning. 
To the extent this is successful, the computer becomes able to predict human moral 
judgments accurately. The AI need not endorse or even understand the moral judg-
ments, but it can tell us which judgments humans would endorse in a moral dilemma. 
The computer would be predicting not what a doctor and others would say when 
aroused at 3 o’clock in the morning but, instead, what the doctor would say in experi-
mental circumstances when less tired, bothered, and hurried.
This method has several advantages. Whereas the top-down method begins 
with a moral principle that some others are bound to question, researchers using the 
bottom-up method do not tell the computer which categories are relevant to pre-
dicting human moral judgments. That is what makes it unsupervised. The bottom-up 
method thus avoids serious objections to the top-down method.
However, the bottom-up method introduces its own problems. First, the bot-
tom-up method devours a great deal of data. Its tremendous appetite arises because 
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very many words or groups of words might be relevant to predicting human moral 
judgments, and it cannot limit what it considers without assuming which categories 
are relevant. Thus, it must consider every word, such as definite versus indefinite 
articles, since such apparently irrelevant words still might predict patterns of moral 
judgment. The system then needs a tremendous body of data in order to determine 
precisely which words or combinations of words are relevant to predicting moral 
judgments.
Second, an unsupervised deep learning system can predict which acts humans 
will judge as wrong, but it cannot tell us why humans judge those acts and not others 
as wrong, much less why they are wrong. When an AI does not use human catego-
ries, it cannot reveal reasons for the moral judgments that humans would recognize 
as reasons. This opacity is an especially serious problem when AI is used in legal, 
military, and medical contexts where people’s lives are at stake, and they deserve to 
know why the AI decided against them.
As before, some theorists have attempted to solve these problems (Guarini, M. 
2006, 2011) or provide limited kinds of interpretability (Wachter et al., 2018). Their 
success has been questioned (Arkin, 2009, 108; Wallach & Allen, 2009, 132-133), but 
their attempts along with others (Anderson & Anderson, 2011) do point the way 
toward a more promising method.
A HYBRID
These problems for the top-down and (unsupervised) bottom-up methods leave 
us wanting a better alternative. The method that we propose here starts with morally 
relevant categories that resemble those in the principles of the top-down method, 
and it also uses machine learning like the bottom-up method. That is why we will call 
our method a hybrid, although it can also be classified (perhaps more accurately) as a 
form of a supervised bottom-up method.
Our method is inspired by the ideal observer tradition in moral philosophy 
(Firth, 1951). According to ideal observer theorists, very roughly, we are justified in be-
lieving that an act is morally wrong if and only if ideal observers would disapprove of 
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that act and other acts of the same kind.3 This central claim of ideal observer theories 
is plausible, because an ideal observer should know what is morally wrong if anyone 
does. This approach assumes nothing about whether ideal observers would disap-
prove of acts on the basis of consequences, rules, or whatever, so it avoids the heated 
controversy between consequentialist and deontological moral theories.
Still, ideal observer theories need to be filled out in at least two ways. First, each 
ideal observer theory needs to specify which observers are ideal. We require ideal 
observers to be informed, rational, and impartial, because these standards imply that 
ideal observers avoid ignorance and forgetfulness, confusion and distorting emo-
tions, and bias and prejudice—the common sources of moral error discussed above.
Second, each ideal observer theory also needs to specify which features of acts 
matter. An ideal observer would be arbitrary and, hence, irrational or incoherent if 
it disapproved of killing a bald person but approved of killing an otherwise similar 
person who was not bald. In contrast, it would make sense for an ideal observer to 
disapprove of killing out of hatred but not disapprove of killing in self-defense. Thus, 
some features of acts are morally relevant, but others are not. The morally relevant 
features are what guide the reactions of ideal observers and determine when acts are 
“of the same kind.”
In order to apply this framework, we need to determine which features of acts 
are and are not morally relevant. Some philosophers have attempted to argue for their 
own lists of morally relevant features (Gert, 2004). Our approach is more empirical. 
We use surveys and experiments to try to come up with a list of features that are or 
are seen as morally relevant.
KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS
As a test case, our team focuses on kidney transplants. A kidney can come from 
a cadaver or a live donor, since most of us have two kidneys but need only one. Some 
donors offer a kidney to a needy stranger, but this is rare. Live donation is more 
common among donor recipient pairs. Imagine that a wife needs a kidney, and her 
husband is willing to donate one of his, but their blood types are not compatible. 
3.  Sometimes the disapproval of ideal observers is seen as constituting moral wrongness, but other 
ideal observer theorists claim only that disapproval by ideal observers is evidence of moral wrongness. 
What matters for our purposes here is only the latter, epistemological version. It is also worth noting 
that some versions of this general approach ask whether ideal observers disapprove of social norms 
that permit acts of the same kind. This variation is what matters for hospital policies and profes-
sional codes of ethics.
Journal of Practical Ethics
WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG & JOSHUA AUGUST SKORBURG10
Suppose also that a brother needs a kidney, and his sister is willing to donate one of 
hers, but they are also not compatible. If the sister is compatible with the wife, and 
the brother is compatible with the husband, then they can exchange kidneys, and 
both patients get what they need. Such kidney exchanges become extremely complex 
when they involve large numbers of potential donors and recipients. That complex-
ity makes AI useful.
The general problem is that there are not enough donors (live or dead) to supply 
all patients in need. Roughly 100,000 people in US alone are waiting for kidney trans-
plants.4 As a result, doctors or hospitals often have to decide which one of two pa-
tients should receive a kidney. Currently, most kidney exchanges make these deci-
sions on the basis of medical compatibility, age, health, organ quality, and time on 
the waiting list. However, many people in our surveys (Doyle et al., in progress) report 
that transplant centers should also consider other factors, such as number of depen-
dents, record of violent crime, and misbehavior causing the kidney disease. Which 
features should determine who gets a kidney is thus a controversial issue where the 
public seems to disagree with hospitals.
This issue is not purely medical but also moral, both because some features of pa-
tients are morally tinged and because it affects the welfare of other people. Identifying 
a recipient can affect the chances of other patients receiving a kidney soon or ever. 
It seems unfair to base such decisions on race, gender, religion, or certain other fea-
tures. It also strikes some as unfair to base such decisions on features like history 
of violent crime or alcohol abuse, which others want to treat as negative indicators. 
Thus, some features seem clearly morally relevant, others seems clearly morally irrel-
evant, and others are controverisal.
This problem becomes complex when a large number of features of each patient 
are considered and a large group of potential donors and recipients are candidates for 
kidney transplant. No matter how we prioritize some patients over others, the puzzle 
of figuring out the best way to distribute the inadequate supply of kidneys becomes 
too complex for any human being. For this reason, algorithms are used to help kidney 
transplant centers decide who gets a kidney first (e.g., Roth, Sönmez, & Ünver, 2004).
Nonetheless, many people react with horror to the idea of AI deciding who lives 
and who dies. They do not object in the same way to using AI to diagnose diseases, 
even though both uses of AI are difficult and affect lives. Why is there more opposi-
4.  https://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/factsheets/Organ-Donation-and-Transplantation-
Stats [accessed 24 November 2020]
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tion to using AI to determine who gets a kidney? Moral subjectivists might answer 
that there is no objectively correct judgment about which act is morally right, whereas 
there is an objectively correct judgment about which disease a patient has. Another 
reply might be that AI (at least in the near future) cannot know what it is like to be a 
human being, much less a patient with kidney disease fighting to stay alive. Such sen-
sitivity to human concerns might seem to be a prerequisite for making life-and-death 
decisions. However, some of these objections can be overcome if we can figure out 
some way to build human concerns, especially human morality, into an AI without 
assuming that these concerns and moral judgments are either universal or objectively 
correct.
HOW TO BUILD MORALITY INTO AI
That is what our team is trying to do. Our research involves several steps and 
methods, including survey, experiment, theory, and computation. This interdisci-
plinary enterprise is too complex and too preliminary to provide full details here, but 
a general outline should convey the basic idea.
GATHER FEATURES
Our project begins by crowdsourcing opinions about which features of patients 
should and should not influence who gets a kidney. We plan to survey both the 
general public and also doctors and hospital administrators, including those who are 
engaged in kidney transplants.
It is important that we ask them not only what should but also what should not 
influence who gets a kidney. The first question will provide morally relevant features 
or categories to supervise the learning by the AI. The second question will show us 
which features we should leave out of the AI in order to avoid biases that people 
themselves recognize as biases (but see below for complications).
No mere survey can tell us which features of patients really should or should not 
influence who gets a kidney. Our goal is only to find out which features people think 
ought to influence that moral decision. By starting with features that other people 
deem morally relevant, we avoid imposing our own assumptions. In addition, survey 
participants might—and did—mention some features that we overlooked.
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EDIT FEATURES
Despite such advantages, open-ended surveys also have disadvantages. 
Participants’ descriptions of features are usually vague or ambiguous. Different par-
ticipants often describe the same feature in different terms. Our next step is then to 
clarify and remove redundancy in the features that participants supplied.
In addition, participants who spend only a few minutes in our surveys might fail 
to mention features that they would see as relevant if they thought of them. To fill in 
such gaps, we can add features that philosophers and other ethicists have proposed as 
morally relevant (Gert, 2004). Each moral theory in effect picks out different features 
as morally relevant.
TEST FEATURES
This editing process requires assumptions and can allow bias to creep in. To 
reduce these problems, we need to try to remain as neutral and open to criticisms 
as we can. We also need to test our revised list. After editing our features for clarity, 
redundancy, and completeness, we can determine whether the edited list is accurate 
by asking new survey participants whether they agree that those edited features are 
morally relevant and whether they want to add any features to the list or remove any. 
This process of refinement and testing might need to be repeated in multiple stages. 
The result will be three lists: features that are seen as morally relevant, features that 
are seen as morally irrelevant, and features that are controversial.
We have already gathered some preliminary information about these features 
(Doyle et al., in progress). Some good news is that the vast majority of our partici-
pants agree that race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, political beliefs, wealth, 
and reliance on government assistance should not influence who gets a kidney (al-
though a different sample always might yield different results on this). It is also not 
surprising that almost all of our participants agree that the urgency of need, time on 
the waiting list, and likelihood of transplant success should affect who gets a kidney, 
along with age, current health, and life expectancy as well as quality of life after a 
transplant. Most also said that smoking and drug and alcohol abuse currently (after 
diagnosis with kidney disease) as well as historically (before diagnosis) should matter. 
It was more controversial whether mental health, record of violent or non-violent 
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crime, or number of children or elderly dependents should affect who gets a kidney 
when there are not enough for everyone.
These preliminary results are only the beginning of a long experimental 
program. Many of these features need to be refined: Which kinds of current health 
problems or crimes count? Does it matter whether past smoking, drinking, and drug 
abuse caused the current need for a kidney transplant? Are age and current health as 
well as exercise habits really just proxies for life expectancy? Is life expectancy what 
matters or is it rather quality of life? We will need separate experiments to answer 
such questions, such as by varying life expectancy independently of age and health to 
determine which of these factors drives moral judgments in this area. Unfortunately, 
no feasible set of experiments could ever answer all of the relevant questions. Still, a 
preliminary list of morally relevant features can get us started.
CONFLICTS
After constructing a list, we need to determine how much weight is put on various 
features on the list. We could simply ask people in a new survey. Unfortunately, 
people seem to be better at identifying which general features are morally relevant 
than they are at reporting how much weight those features should have in conflicts. 
A more promising method constructs conflicts among features on the list and then 
asks participants which patient should receive a kidney in those conflicts.
It is easy to construct conflicts from a short list of features. If features 1-3 are on 
the list, we can ask participants to decide who gets a kidney when feature 1 favors 
patient A but features 2-3 favor patient B, when features 1-2 favor patient A but 
feature 3 favors patient B, when features 1 and 3 favor patient A but feature 2 favors 
patient B, and so on. We can also vary the degree of the difference between Patients 
A and B, such as the difference between their life expectancies, alcohol consumption 
levels, or number of dependent children. How a participant distributes the kidney in 
these conflicts will reveal how those features interact in producing the judgments of 
this participant.
One obvious problem is that the number of comparisons grows exponentially 
along with the number of relevant features. It quickly becomes practically infeasible 
to ask participants so many conflicts as well as computationally intractable to deter-
mine how all of the features interact. Nonetheless, some progress can be made by 
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analyzing a limited number of features at a time and by asking only about a subset of 
conflicts that provide the most information about how people weigh features.
We have begun to gather data of this kind on our website (whogetsthekidney.
com). One feature that we added was an option to flip a coin instead of giving the 
kidney to either patient. This coin flip option gives extra information that helps us 
derive weights and interactions. For example, if participants flip a coin when they 
see no significant difference between the patients, then we can tell which differences 
participants see as significant.5 
ANALYSIS
After gathering enough data of the right kind, machine learning can help to de-
termine: (A) Which features really do influence participants’ moral judgments about 
who should get a kidney, (B) How these features interact to produce an overall judg-
ment, and (C) Which model best predicts each individual’s moral judgments. The 
AI can be trained on one set of data, tested on another, and refined in light of the 
test results. In this way, it can learn how to predict human moral judgments about 
distributing kidneys.
This machine learning is supervised because it uses the categories that partici-
pants judged to be morally relevant in previous surveys. That minimal supervision 
reduces the amount of data that is required. It also makes the results more interpre-
table. The AI will, hopefully, be able to spell out a model that predicts an individual’s 
moral judgments. By inspecting that model, we can find out which features affect that 
person’s moral judgments. Those features (at least sometimes) correspond to reasons 
for the judgment, such as when a patient’s old age is a reason to give the kidney to 
the other, younger patient. If the features that predict a moral judgment correspond 
with the individual’s reasons for endorsing that moral judgment, then the AI can 
reveal not only that but why this person makes that moral judgment. This transparen-
cy is an advantage over the bottom-up method described above (using unsupervised 
deep learning), both because it makes the theory explanatory and also because people 
often deserve to know the reasons behind moral decisions that affect their lives.
5.  Significance here is not the same as relevance, because relevance applies to individual features, 
whereas significant difference is a relation between features.
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PROMISE
One payoff from this procedure is that we can compare what people say should 
affect their moral judgments and how they say those reasons should interact against 
which factors really do affect their moral judgments and how. We can learn how much 
insight humans have into the computations that produce their moral views. We can 
also compare the models that best predict moral judgments by different individuals, 
and different groups. This method can, thus, help move moral psychology forward in 
fruitful directions.
COMPLICATIONS 
Although this general plan might look simple, several complications arise 
quickly.
Philosophers often speak of weighing one moral consideration against another. 
Reality is not so simple. It is unlikely that each consideration can be given a simple 
weight: five kilograms of dependents (three children and two elderly parents?) minus 
four kilograms of fault for causing one’s own kidney disease (because one drank four 
drinks a day for forty years?) equals one kilogram in favor of this patient. No way!
Instead, moral considerations are more likely to interact in complex ways that 
philosophers are only beginning to map (Horty, 2014; Snedegar, 2017). One complica-
tion is that the force of a moral consideration can vary with context, as particularists 
emphasize. Having five or ten child dependents strikes many as a reason to give the 
parent a kidney, but the same number of children might not count at all or as much 
if that patient was convicted of child abuse. Again, having been on the waiting list 
only a short time might count less against a patient if that patient’s need is as urgent 
as others who were diagnosed earlier, because they had access to better doctors. And 
the quality of a patient’s life after transplant might matter less if that patient is not 
responsible for facing a deprived life. Different factors will surely interact in different 
ways for different individuals in different situations. Machine learning might be able 
to capture more of these complex interactions than humans do, but we should not 
expect perfection. There are too many subtleties and contexts to figure out.
Another complication is probability. Both risk (known probabilities) and uncer-
tainty (unknown probabilities) pervade kidney transplants. It is unrealistic to claim 
that someone’s life expectancy is precisely 42 years. Instead, there is a probability that 
Journal of Practical Ethics
WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG & JOSHUA AUGUST SKORBURG16
this individual will die within 10 years, another probability that she will die in 10-20, 
20-30, 30-40, 40-50, etc. The reality is a complex array of probabilities rather than a 
single precise figure, and we do not know any of these probabilities precisely. The 
same complication arises for other factors. If someone smoke and drank, there is a 
probability that his smoking and drinking caused his kidney problems, but nobody 
can be certain. The probability might vary with how much he smoked or drank and 
during which period of life.
Most people are not knowledgeable or sophisticated enough to understand 
probabilities (more on this below). Still, we will need to do our best to figure out 
how probabilities affect people’s moral judgments, accommodate legitimate aversion 
to risk and uncertainty, and then correct for clear errors in probabilistic reasoning. 
These tasks will not be easy, but careful training and research can make some prog-
ress (Gigerenzer, 2015).
Yet another complication is that humans are not consistent. They make differ-
ent judgments of the same act in the same circumstances when they judge on differ-
ent days and in different frames (order and wording, for example). We need to under-
stand such foibles and correct for them. For example, if we can understand how the 
order or wording of scenarios influences moral judgments about them, then an AI 
can predict which moral judgments would be made by humans who saw both frames. 
This research will again be difficult and imperfect, but some progress can be made if 
we try.
IDEAL OBSERVERS?
Can we also correct for other sources of error? Recall that an ideal observer is 
supposed to be informed, rational, and unbiased. If an AI is supposed to play the role 
of an ideal observer, as we propose, then we need to construct it so that it predicts 
not only which moral judgments humans actually make but also how humans ideally 
would judge acts if they were informed, rational, and unbiased.
To say that a moral judgment or decision is biased is to say that it results from 
a cognitive bias or some feature—such as race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, 
wealth, or attractiveness—that should not affect the moral judgment or decision. In 
our surveys, most people agreed that these features should not affect kidney distri-
bution. This consensus gives us reason to avoid basing moral judgments on those 
features (though we could exclude these features on other grounds as well).
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One might think that these biases could be avoided simply by imposing a kind of 
veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1952, 1971). If participants in a survey do not know whether 
one or the other of two patients is black, Muslim, female, gay, poor, or ugly, then those 
features cannot directly influence their moral judgments about which patient should 
get a kidney. Nonetheless, their moral judgments could still be influenced indirectly 
when they use other features that are correlated with the features whose influence 
we and they want to avoid. For example, geographic information (such as post codes) 
will correlate with race and wealth, so using geographic information might implicate 
forbidden features. Such indirect bias will be hard to detect and remove completely. 
Still, ignorance of forbidden attributes can enable us to reduce bias by better approx-
imating which moral judgments humans would make if they were less biased. An AI 
could perhaps then reflect those less-biased judgments if it also has no information 
about such morally irrelevant factors.
Moreover, when bias does indirectly creep in, we might be able to determine 
how much bias occurs by comparing the probability that, for example, a black patient 
gets a kidney with the probability that a white patient gets a kidney, other features 
being equal.6 Then we will be able to correct for that bias in an AI. It is much harder 
to correct for biases in humans. Nonetheless, an AI that excludes known biasing 
factors and also corrects for known indirect biases could still display some residual 
bias. Perfection is unattainable, but that should not stop us from trying to do better 
than we do now.
To become a proxy for ideal observers, an AI must also predict which moral judg-
ments humans would make if they were informed and rational. The problem is that 
our survey participants are not fully informed or completely rational. The judgments 
they made in our surveys and experiments were probably often based on ignorance 
and confusion.
To solve this problem, recall the Marshall Hypothesis. Just as Marshall analyzed 
statistics to determine what people would say about capital punishment if they knew 
more about it, so we can use information from our surveys and experiments to deter-
mine how people would distribute kidneys if they were informed and rational. We 
can measure effects of ignorance by asking participants questions to reveal how much 
they know about the situation or by providing participants with different amounts of 
6.  Data involving forbidden attributes (such as race, religion, gender, etc.) will be needed in order 
to detect the presence of bias and correct for it, so the system as a whole cannot be totally ignorant of 
these attributes, but it will use this information in a different way. See Kroll et al. (2016) for a discus-
sion of this and related issues.
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information: no, some, moderate, and much information. These manipulations will 
enable us to measure how much their moral judgments would have been affected if 
they had had that information when they originally took the survey. If their judg-
ments change when they receive more information, their original judgment depend-
ed on ignorance of that information. And if that new information is relevant, and 
they see it as relevant, then they and we should agree that the more informed moral 
judgment is better or at least more in line with their real values.
Similar manipulations can be used to determine when moral judgments depend 
on confusion. In our kidney test cases, we can vary the number or complexity of fea-
tures given for each potential recipient. We could present participants with pairs of 
patients who differ in three, six, or nine of their features. Or we could present many 
patients at once. If a participant places a great deal of weight on a feature when nine 
features of each participant are revealed or when choosing among nine patients, but 
not when only three features of two patients are revealed, then this pattern provides 
some evidence that this participant’s moral judgment results from the presence of the 
other features or patients. That might be because so many complex features of pa-
tients created confusion (though it might not be easy to distinguish confusion from 
context-dependence). If so, we can predict what the participant would say if she were 
not so confused.
Admittedly, these rough experimental suggestions are far from conclusive, and 
we have not tested all of them to see whether they would work. The point for now is 
just that nothing in principle stands in the way of gathering the information that an 
AI would need in order to predict the moral judgments that humans would make if 
they were not biased, ignorant, or confused. Such an AI could serve as a proxy for an 
ideal observer or at least evidence of how an ideal observer who is informed, rational, 
and impartial would make moral judgments and decisions in cases like these.
GOALS
What does this accomplish? What does it not accomplish?
Our goal is not to create an AI to tell people what is really and truly moral or 
immoral. We do not assume, as some ideal observer theorists do, that moral judg-
ments by idealized humans constitute moral wrongness or rightness. Ideal observ-
ers might be inaccurate in some cases, but they can still provide evidence of what is 
morally right or wrong. That is all we need in order for an AI that tells us how ideal 
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observers would judge acts to be helpful to us in deciding what we should believe and 
do in complex moral situations.
Our goal is also not to replace doctors. We only want to help doctors like the 
kidney surgeon at 3:00 a.m. The doctor still has to decide. We would not want to 
hand the decision over to an AI completely (in the foreseeable future), but an AI 
can still help. Suppose the surgeon at 3:00 a.m. thinks that patient A should get the 
kidney but then runs an AI trained on the surgeon’s own moral judgments in hun-
dreds of conflicts, and the AI predicts what the surgeon would say in the absence of 
ignorance, confusion, or bias. If the AI agrees with the surgeon’s moral judgment, 
then the surgeon is justified in being more confident than if the AI disagreed with 
her moral judgment. And if the AI disagrees with the surgeon’s current moral judg-
ment, then the surgeon would have reason to stop and reflect more and maybe seek 
help from others (such as a hospital ethics committee, if there is time). Doctors who 
must make difficult moral decisions under time pressure without adequate informa-
tion should be grateful for such help.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE: ARTIFICIAL 
IMPROVED DEMOCRACY (AID)
Doctors are not the only ones who need help. Such aids can be used in many 
different areas of morality, including law, military, business, personal life, and so on. 
In each area, we will need to:
(i) Ask the folk or experts to describe moral problems in that area,
(ii) Ask them which features are morally relevant,
(iii) Edit their features (for clarity, redundancy, and completeness),
(iv) Construct scenarios in which those edited features conflict,
(v) Ask which act is wrong in those conflicts,
(vi) Extract models for individuals, and
(vii) Learn or improve the model by applying it to new scenarios. 
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Then we could also correct those models for ignorance, confusion, and partiality 
in order to make them more ideal.
This method in general can be known as artificial improved democracy. It is de-
mocracy insofar as it rests on surveys of opinions from the general public. It improves 
on democracy by correcting for common errors to reveal what people really value 
and what they would judge if they were informed, rational, and impartial. And it is 
artificial because it is embodied in a computer program. Overall, it is AID (Artificial 
Improved Democracy), because its point is to aid people in making better moral 
judgments.
This method could potentially help a wide range of people avoid the most 
common sources of error in human moral judgment in a wide range of areas. Drivers 
use GPS to tell them where they ought to turn, because they know that they are igno-
rant and confused, and they often do and should trust the GPS even when their in-
stincts point them in a different direction. This analogy makes us hopeful that people 
might be willing to use AI to help them avoid the common kinds of mistakes to which 
we are all prone. An AI that tells them which moral judgments they would make if 
they were more ideal could serve almost (though not exactly) like a conscience. They 
could correct their moral mistakes in light what they learned from the AI. The AI 
would thereby reduce the incidence of human moral mistakes both in judgment and 
in action. Who does not want that? Some (Cave et al., 2019) fear that depending on 
a moral AI will erode humans’ skills at making their own moral judgments and that 
moral mistakes by the AI will be hard for humans to detect. However, we think that 
these potential dangers are overblown, can be minimized, and, hence, are overridden 
by potential benefits of a moral AI in reducing moral mistakes by humans.
DIFFERENCES
An AI that creates a model for each participant might also explain differences 
among individuals and groups. We could compare individual models to understand 
moral judgments by old friends whose moral judgments still remain mysterious. We 
could also learn how many and which other people would disagree with us. A doctor 
might like to know how many others in the hospital or the public would make a dif-
ferent moral judgment on a case. And if the models are interpretable, they could also 
tell us why we disagree with other individuals, because they will cite combinations of 
features that humans see as morally relevant.
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In addition, we could aggregate models for individuals into models for groups. 
There are several competing ways to aggregate, and it is not clear which is best for 
these purposes (Brandt, Conitzer, & Endriss, 2016). Still, some group models might 
be able to help us understand, for example, why people in the US and the UK make 
different moral judgments about some issues but not others. The differences between 
their aggregate models can explain why they output different moral judgments when 
they do.
APPLICATIONS IN MEDICINE
Having laid out our general method and our test case with kidney exchanges, we 
want to conclude by suggesting that AID could also be applied to many other issues 
in bioethics. In the first place, it should be easy to see how our proposed methods 
could be extended to transplantations of other organs, such as heart, lung, liver, pan-
creas, etc.
We think AID could also be applied to other cases involving the allocation 
of scarce medical resources. The method could be adapted for issues such as life-
sustaining treatments, experimental therapies, emergency medicine, end-of-life 
issues, or critical care. In all of these cases, questions about how to distribute equip-
ment, treatments, funding, drugs, clinicians’ time, etc., could be subjected to hybrid 
methods that combine some top-down principles (such as optimizing for the overall 
number of patients seen or caring for the sickest patients first) with some bottom-up 
principles learned from representative surveys of many different stakeholders. These 
findings could then be used to design systems to reflect both shared values and ideal 
decision procedures.
The application of our methods, however, need not be limited to cases involv-
ing scarce resources. In our discussion above, we also raised the prospect of correct-
ing for various kinds of biases. This aspect is especially promising, given increasing 
scholarly interest in how various kinds of cognitive biases challenge foundational 
concepts in bioethics (e.g. Blumenthal-Barby, 2016).
To see this, consider informed consent, which is “currently treated as the core of 
bioethics” (Eyal, 2019). Very roughly, informed consent is crucial because disclosing 
necessary information to a patient or research participant (so that they can under-
stand the information and voluntarily decide whether or not to undergo treatment 
or take part in research) is one of the best ways to ensure the protection of the pa-
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tient’s interests, health, and well-being, while also respecting them as autonomous 
individuals.
Various kinds of biases can undermine this foundational concept in many ways. 
We will focus here on just one kind, optimism biases, which have been extensively 
explored by Lynn Jansen and colleagues (e.g. Jansen, 2014; Jansen et al., 2018). Jansen 
(2014) asks us to consider the difficult decision of a cancer patient who is given the 
option to participate in an early-phase research trial. In cases like this, standard thera-
pies have probably been ineffective for the patient. The probability of significant im-
provement from participating in an early-phase research trial is, almost by definition, 
very low. But when patients who decide to take part in such trials are asked to explain 
their decision, “they often reveal unrealistically high expectations for therapeutic 
benefit from participation” (Jansen 2014, 26). In other words, patients often overesti-
mate the benefits they are likely to receive and underestimate the risks. The worry is 
that, to the extent that patients are mistaken about the likely outcomes, their consent 
to participate in the research is not truly informed.
Just as Marshall raised the question of whether people would still support the 
death penalty if they were not ignorant of the relevant evidence, we can raise the 
question here of whether patients would still agree to participate in early-phase re-
search trials if they were not ignorant of the relevant probabilities of therapeutic 
benefit. Perhaps some patients would want to participate in the trial, no matter how 
low the probability. Perhaps other patients would change their mind about partici-
pating if they thought more carefully and accurately about the likely outcomes. Per 
our method, we treat this as an open empirical question which should make use of 
all of the tools at our disposal, including AI methods that might be able to shed light 
on difficult questions about the extent to which individual judgments relevant to 
informed consent are driven by various kinds of cognitive bias.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing should suffice to show the initial promise of the AID method for 
bioethics, ranging from issues as diverse as organ transplants to informed consent. 
While very much work remains to determine whether this initial promise will be 
fulfilled, it seems likely that, as the practice of medicine becomes increasingly in-
tertwined with Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence, so too will the prac-
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tices and methods of bioethics become similarly intertwined with these powerful 
technologies.
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